Killing Begets Killing: Evidence From a Bug-Killing Paradigm That Initial Killing Fuels Subsequent Killing by Martens, A. et al.
Killing begets killing 1 
Running Head: KILLING BEGETS KILLING 
 
 
 
Killing Begets Killing: Evidence from a Bug-Killing Paradigm that Initial Killing Fuels 
Subsequent Killing 
 
Andy Martens 
University of Canterbury 
 
Spee Kosloff   Jeff Greenberg  
     University of Arizona 
 
Mark J. Landau Toni Schmader 
University of Arizona 
 
 
Reference:  
Martens, A., Kosloff, S., Greenberg, J., Landau, M.J., & Schmader, T. (2007). Killing begets 
killing: Evidence from a bug-killing paradigm that initial killing fuels subsequent 
killing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1251-1264. 
 
 
 
Authors’ Note: We thank Rich Willams, Kalinea Muldrow, Jeremy Falk, Craig Santerre, 
Todd Burgess, and Courtney Robinson for all their help with this project. Please address 
correspondence to Andy Martens, Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury, 
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand; e-mail: andy.martens@canterbury.ac.nz 
Word count: 10,423 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Killing appears to perpetuate itself even in the absence of retaliation. This phenomenon may 
occur in part as a means to justify prior killing and so ease the threat of prior killing. 
Additionally, this effect should arise particularly when a killer perceives similarity to the 
victims, because similarity should exacerbate threat from killing. To examine these ideas we 
developed a bug-killing paradigm in which we manipulated the degree of initial bug-killing 
in a “practice task” in order to observe the effects on subsequent self-paced killing during a 
timed “extermination task.” In Studies 1 and 2, for participants reporting some similarity to 
bugs, inducing greater initial killing led to more subsequent self-paced killing. In Study 3, 
after greater initial killing, more subsequent self-paced killing led to more favorable affective 
change. Implications for understanding lethal human violence are discussed. 
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Killing Begets Killing: Evidence from a Bug-Killing Paradigm that Initial Killing Fuels 
Subsequent Killing 
The course of human history has been replete with incidents of mass and protracted 
killing. In conflicts throughout the world, violence and carnage seem to fuel further violence 
and carnage. Killing often furthers killing in the context of retribution, wherein cycles of 
retaliation provoke mounting inflictions of death (e.g., Pruitt, 1998; Baumeister, 1996). Yet 
killing may also beget more killing because of motivations that are not retributive in nature. 
In particular, theorists and researchers (e.g., Staub, 2002; Lifton, 1986; Darley, 1992; Gross, 
2006) have suggested that the act of killing may provide its own “fuel” for subsequent killing 
as part of a perpetrator’s psychological efforts to justify his or her own morbidly violent 
actions.  
The idea that killing might “feed” on itself—that is, instigate motivations for further 
killing—is illustrated in instances of predominantly one-sided killing, such as genocide, in 
which initially limited killings escalate into progressively bigger massacres (Charny, 2002; 
Harff, 2002). Other support for this idea is provided by laboratory demonstrations showing 
that incremental increases in aggression facilitate further and more severe obedience-
instigated aggressive acts (Milgram, 1974). Research has also demonstrated a self-initiated or 
voluntary tendency toward elevations in aggression over time (e.g., Buss, Booker, & Buss, 
1972; Geen & Stonner, 1973; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Zimbardo, 1973; 
Goldstein, Davis, & Herman, 1975). In so-called “aggression machine” studies, where 
participants act as “teachers” administering electric shocks to “learners,” the duration, 
intensity, and/or frequency of the shocks administered tends to drift upwards over the course 
of successive trials—often in the absence of incentive or pressure to increase the aggression 
(Goldstein, Davis, & Herman, 1975).  
For obvious reasons, however, laboratory procedures to date have not permitted direct 
and systematic investigation of why killing promotes further killing. Existing research 
methodologies for studying aggression surely afford some insight into the psychology of 
killing (e.g., Berkowitz et al., 1962; Buss, 1961; Carlson, Marcus-Newhall, & Miller, 1989; 
McGregor et al., 1998; Russell et al., 1996), and although many of the processes involved in 
aggression may in fact be similar to those we propose, the act of killing—taking life—is 
unique among forms of aggression in its permanence and impact. The person killed cannot be 
brought back to life, nor can the loss to those who loved the victim be rectified.  Perhaps as a 
consequence, killing and the threat of killing have historically been extremely important in 
affecting the course of history, particularly in the context of assassination, revolution, 
oppression, war, terrorism, and genocide.    
In the present research, we have therefore endeavored to directly study killing 
behavior and its psychological underpinnings using a procedure in which participants believe 
they are killing a number of bugs in a self-paced extermination task. To investigate the 
hypothesis that killing begets killing, we examined whether manipulating the number of bugs 
killed during an initial “practice” trial would determine the number of bugs subsequently 
killed in a self-paced trial, and whether such an effect is moderated by the threat of killing a 
target perceived as similar to the perpetrator. 
Willful killing as a response to threat 
Theoretical accounts (e.g., Lifton, 1986; Kressel, 1996) suggest that the will to further 
killing can stem from attempts to cope with guilt and concerns with negative implications for 
one’s character that initial or prior killing may trigger. The notion that killing can pose this 
kind of psychological threat to perpetrators is well supported (e.g., Baum, 2004; Lifton, 
1974). For example, investigation into armed conflicts throughout history consistently makes 
clear the great initial difficulties soldiers have firing upon an enemy (Marshall, 1947; 
Grossman & Siddle, 2000). Furthermore, in a study investigating U.S. soldiers engaged in 
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combat during the Vietnam War, those who killed showed more severe Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder symptoms than those who did not kill, and this effect remained after statistically 
controlling for self-reported intensity of battle experience (MacNair, 2005).   
To the extent that killing behavior provokes psychological discomfort or threat in the 
killer, engaging in killing behavior may elicit defensive responses to cope with that threat. In 
particular, individuals who kill may become motivated to counteract the negative emotional 
consequences of their morally discrepant behavior. Such efforts may be understood as 
attempts to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Moreover, the literature on 
dissonance reduction suggests that one way to keep at bay the psychological discomfort 
resulting from commitment to counterattitudinal behavior is to view such behavior as 
justified (Brehm & Cohen, 1962), leading to subsequent maintenance or increases in the 
frequency of that behavior. Thus, perpetuation of killing may be motivated in part by efforts 
to cope with the psychological threat engendered by prior killing. Lifton illustrates this ironic 
and harrowing psychological process: 
“We [Nazis] have gone so far now that we have no way out.” There are two possible 
implications here: the moral principle that the evil could not be undone; and the 
psychological principle that, having maintained a death factory for a period of time, 
one felt impelled to continue its function. The psychological point is that atrocity 
begets atrocity: continuing to kill becomes psychologically necessary in order to 
justify the killing and to view it as other than it is. (Lifton, 1986, p.213) 
Initial killing in conflicts, however, often occurs with some form of external 
justification. As war-criminal trials often reveal (Arendt, 1964), and as Milgram’s 
investigations of obedience further support (Milgram, 1974), people frequently kill initially in 
response to orders or in response to pressure from peers. And according to cognitive 
dissonance theory, the stronger this external justification, the less we might expect arousal of 
dissonance and threat. Yet the undeniable fact of personal responsibility for carrying out a 
killing and the irrevocable commitment such an act entails (the dead cannot be brought back) 
likely make it difficult for individuals to attribute their behavior solely to the influence of a 
legitimizing authority or to otherwise easily resolve the psychological discomfort that such 
behavior induces.  
Moreover, killing in conflicts only rarely occurs in response to a direct threat on one’s 
life (e.g., at gunpoint; Kessel, 1996). Instead the pressures to kill are more subtle, though no 
less powerful. They come from pressure to fit in, to do one’s duty or one’s work as a soldier, 
and to maintain esteem in the eyes of peers (e.g., Kessel, 1996; Lifton, 1986). Thus, 
individuals who are initially compelled by some pressure to kill may later attempt to justify 
such unsavory behavior—“to view it as other than it is”—resulting in the willful perpetuation 
or increase in killing. In sum, one prominent response to the psychological threat associated 
with an initial act of killing may be to justify such action through continued, willful killing.  
Target similarity as a source of threat from killing 
Though we have argued that perpetrators are likely to feel some responsibility for 
killing—that their actions cannot be fully justified by some external force—people may 
nevertheless vary in their potential to experience threat from killing. One particular 
predisposition to experience threat from killing may stem from perceptions of similarity to 
the target. Similarity generally engenders positive feelings toward targets (e.g., Byrne, 1997; 
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and so should also increase the potential to experience threat 
from killing by making such action seem more ethically reprehensible. Additionally, 
perceived similarity to the targets of killing may increase the potential for empathy with the 
victims, thereby increasing the emotional effects of killing. Detailed reports from Vietnam 
veterans suggest that trauma and dissonance worsens when perpetrators encounter evidence 
that their victims are not so different from themselves and have the same basic concerns—
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i.e., the dead have families too, they also carry pictures and letters from their wives and 
children, etc. (Lifton, 1974). To describe this relationship between trauma from killing and 
connectedness to the victim one V.A. psychologist explains “You recognized you did the 
unthinkable. You blasted away a piece of yourself, violated some trust with God...” (Baum, 
2004).  
Moreover, evidence suggests that threatening aspects of similarity can spur negative 
responding to similar others. For example, laboratory research shows that perceived 
similarity can elicit harsher responding towards similar others when these similar people 
possess negative characteristics (e.g., Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Martens et al., 2004; Silvia, 
Graham, & Hawley, 2005; Taylor & Mettee, 1971). In this work, the threat of similarity 
stems from the implication that by association one may also be negatively characterized. This 
is in contrast to threat stemming from having harmed the similar other. Nevertheless, the 
work broadly shows that under some circumstances, similarity to others can pose a threat that 
motivates harsher responding in an effort to re-establish psychological equanimity.  
In addition to this research, in instances of war or genocide, similarity seems 
frequently and intimately related to the conflict between victim and perpetrator. Perpetrators 
and victims are often members of highly similar communities, with similar lifestyles and who 
seem indistinguishable beyond some labeled difference (e.g., an armband, uniform, color, 
identification card, etc.). Further, conflicts with similar others, such as civil wars, seem 
especially brutal and persistent (e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003).1 
In sum, similarity typically engenders positive feelings and responses toward targets, 
suggesting that perceived similarity should predispose a reluctance to kill. However, once one 
does kill a victim, the more similar the victim to the self, the greater may be the threat to 
one’s psychological equanimity. Thus, perceived similarity to the target may fuel the 
promulgating effect of initial killing on subsequent willful killing.  
The present studies 
We conducted three studies to assess the idea that the degree of coerced initial killing 
determines the frequency of later killing as a function of perceived similarity. Killing 
behavior was measured as the number of small pill bugs put into a grinder during a self-paced 
20-second supposed extermination task. Prior to engaging in this task, we manipulated the 
amount of pill bugs participants were initially directed to exterminate in a “practice” task. 
Further, to assess the hypothesis that increased killing behavior reflects a defense against the 
threat associated with killing something similar to oneself, we measured perceived similarity 
to bugs prior to the experiment. We predicted that the greater the perceived similarity, the 
more initial killing should beget subsequent self-paced killing.  
Study 1 
In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that perceived similarity to insects would have a 
very different relationship to self-paced killing behavior depending on whether participants 
were first coerced to kill. Based on the idea that similarity generally engenders positive 
orientations towards targets (e.g., Byrne, 1997; Galinsky & Moscowitz, 2000), we 
hypothesized that participants who performed no initial killing would be reluctant to 
subsequently kill bugs during the self-paced task if they perceived the bugs as similar to 
themselves. However, insofar as perceived similarity increases the threat engendered by 
initial killing, which in turn heightens efforts to reduce this threat by way of continued 
killing, then killing one bug initially should eliminate or reverse this inhibitory relationship 
between similarity and self-paced killing.  
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-two introductory psychology students at the University of Arizona participated 
to partially fulfill a course requirement. Two participants discontinued the experiment after 
Killing begets killing 5 
reading the consent form. Six participants were excluded from analyses because they 
expressed strong suspicion—they did not believe they were killing the bugs. This left 74 
participants (35 male, 39 female). 
Materials and Procedure  
To assess individual differences in the extent to which participants viewed themselves 
as similar to bugs, we obtained a measure of perceived similarity weeks prior to the study in a 
mass survey session. This measure consisted of a single item asking participants to “Please 
rate how similar/different you think you are to small insects” on a 9-point bipolar scale 
ranging from not at all similar (1) to extremely similar (9). A similar question was used 
successfully in past research also investigating the threatening implications of similarity 
(Martens et al., 2004). The experimenter was blind to these ratings. 
Given the non-human targets of the similarity question, we collected supplemental 
data to get a sense of how participants construed this question. We asked 47 people at the end 
of an unrelated study to respond to this similarity item, and if they rated their similarity as 
greater than 1, to briefly describe “in what way do you see yourself as similar to them?”  
Thirty-three people rated their similarity as above 1 on the scale. Of these, 25 reported 
essentially that bugs are living too—that we are part of the same evolutionary process and 
have similar basic needs, such as for shelter, food, to survive, and to protect offspring. Four 
people described their similarity in terms of also being small in an overwhelmingly big 
universe. Four people did not respond.   
 Cover story and extermination machine. One or two participants arrived in the 
laboratory and were told the study concerned how people in various roles deal with different 
animals. The experimenter described that “in this particular session today, we’ll be looking at 
the role of exterminators who deal with bugs. So one thing I want everyone to know is that 
the study does involve engaging in a short bug extermination task.” Participants were 
informed that afterward they would complete questionnaires asking about their experience 
performing the task. Each participant was then ushered into a private cubicle and asked to 
read and sign a consent form if they wished to continue.  
Each participant was escorted from the cubicle to another cubicle containing materials 
and equipment for the extermination task (See Fig. 1). Once within the extermination cubicle, 
the experimenter told the participant that he/she would be familiarized with the extermination 
task. On a desk was the purported extermination machine, which was composed of a stainless 
steel coffee grinder with the safety interlock top removed and a single piece of brass tubing 
inserted through the side of the removable bowl assembly. The tube was curved at its base so 
that the length of it extended vertically several inches above the grinder, giving the 
appearance of a chute leading directly from the tube tip to the steel blades concealed within 
the lidded grinder. At the tip of the tube rested a white plastic funnel into which bugs could 
easily be dropped. Inserted at the base of the tube was an unseen stopper, which prevented 
bugs from actually entering into the vicinity of the grinder blades. The apparatus was fitted 
with an activation button, which, when depressed, initiated the grinder such that the blades 
could be heard and felt to spin with strong force. Torn bits of paper were planted within the 
grinder, so as to simulate the sound of grinding bugs.  
Initial killing manipulation. The experimenter pointed to the grinder and identified it 
to the participant as an extermination machine. The experimenter explained that though 
exterminators generally use poison sprays to treat pest problems, use of such sprays is not 
permitted inside the Psychology building for health and safety reasons, which is why 
participants were instead being asked to use the grinder to perform the task. In the initial-kill 
condition, a single pill bug was preset in a 4.5 oz, clear, lidless plastic cup placed beside the 
extermination machine (see Figure 1). These pill bugs, with segmented exoskeletons, 
measure approximately 1cm in length. After being given an opportunity to “take a look at the 
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bug so you know what you’re working with,” initial-kill participants were asked to pick up 
the cup and dump the one bug into the grinder and then press the activation button for at least 
three seconds. Participants in the no-initial-kill condition were likewise ushered into the 
extermination cubicle, introduced to the materials and procedure, and shown the bug preset in 
the cup. However, these participants did not exterminate the bug. The procedure was simply 
explained to them.  
 Each participant was then escorted back to his or her original cubicle and provided 
with information about the bugs. The experimenter explained that just as exterminators know 
about the bugs they work with, participants will read about the bugs before engaging in the 
extermination task. After reviewing a brief description of the bugs,2 participants were 
individually guided back to the extermination cubicle. There the experimenter explained that 
“to give you a brief extermination experience, I’m going to ask you to put bugs into the 
grinder for a 20-second period.” In front of participants were 20 clear plastic cups on a flat 
14” X 18” plastic tray. Each plastic cup contained a single pill bug. Also in front of 
participants sat a digital timer preset to count down from 20 seconds. Participants were 
instructed to wait until the experimenter left the cubicle and closed the door, at which time 
they could press start on the timer and begin the task of putting the bugs, one by one, into the 
grinder. Participants were asked to perform the task continuously over the 20-second period, 
and, when time expired, to cease the timer’s alarm by pressing the stop button and to activate 
the grinder blades for at least three seconds by depressing the activation button. Following 
the task, participants were guided back to their original cubicle, and the experimenter 
surreptitiously recorded the number of bugs the participant placed in the grinder based on the 
number of empty cups.   
 Back in the original cubicle, participants were presented with final questionnaires 
asking about their experience of the extermination task and perceptions of the bugs. The first 
page was the Expanded Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 
1994) included to measure affect. Next participants responded to six questions on bipolar 9-
point scales ranging from not at all (1) to completely (9). The first two were filler questions, 
followed by a question pertaining to perceptions of choice during the extermination task: 
“During the 20-second timed extermination procedure, to what extent did you feel that the 
number of bugs you put in was your choice?” Participants in the initial killing condition were 
also asked “In the first task when you ‘familiarized’ yourself with the extermination 
procedure, to what extent did you feel that putting the pill bug into the machine was your 
choice?” The final two questions assessed participants’ perceptions of similarity to the pill 
bugs: “How similar do you feel that you are to the pill bugs?” and “How different do you feel 
that you are to the pill bugs?” These two items were highly correlated, r = -.59, p < .01. The 
second item was reverse coded and averaged with the first to create a composite index of 
post-study similarity to pill bugs (M = 2.80, SD = 1.83) that was significantly related to our 
mass-survey measure of similarity to insects (M = 2.79, SD = 1.92), r = .42, p < .01. 
Finally, participants were thoroughly probed for suspicion and debriefed.  Here the 
deceptive elements were fully and sensitively revealed. We stressed that they had not killed 
any bugs. Additionally, we explained in great detail the study’s purpose and its potential 
applicability to real world problems. All participants were invited to express concerns about 
the experiment in private consultation with the experimenter. No participants reported serious 
concerns and many expressed that they found the experiment interesting and worthwhile. 
Results and Discussion  
Self-paced killing3 
We hypothesized that with no initial killing, prior perceived similarity to bugs would 
lead to reluctance to kill them, and therefore to decreased self-paced killing. In the initial 
killing condition, however, subsequent killing is expected to function as a defense against the 
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threatening implications of initial killing. The relationship between prior similarity and self-
paced killing should therefore be eliminated or reversed in this condition insofar as similarity 
contributes to perceived threat from killing and defensive responses to such threat.  
To examine this hypothesis, we regressed the number of bugs placed into the 
extermination grinder during the 20-second self-paced task onto initial killing (0 vs. 1 bug; 
dummy coded), the continuous measure of prior perceived similarity to bugs (mean centered), 
and their interaction. Only the interaction was significant, β = .50, SE = .46, t = 2.25, p < .05. 
We plotted this interaction in Figure 2 using one standard deviation above (higher similarity) 
and below (lower similarity) the mean of similarity (Aiken & West, 1991). Analyses of the 
simple slopes indicate that, among participants who did not kill any bugs initially, the higher 
participants rated their similarity to bugs prior to the experiment, the fewer bugs they put into 
the grinder during the 20-second extermination task, β = -.44, SE = .30, t = -2.99, p < .01. 
However, among participants who killed one bug initially, this inverse relationship was 
eliminated such that higher prior similarity no longer predicted fewer bugs killed during the 
20-second task, β = .07, SE = .36, t = .42, p = .68. These results suggest then that greater 
perceived similarity to bugs prior to the experiment led to decreased self-paced killing in the 
absence of an initial kill, but that following an initial kill, this inhibiting effect of similarity 
on self-paced killing disappeared. 
To examine the data differently, we also tested the effects of initial killing for those 
higher (1 SD above) and lower (1 SD below) in perceived prior similarity to bugs. Consistent 
with our reasoning that the threat of killing a similar target may drive the effect of initial 
killing on subsequent killing, we predicted an increase in self-paced killing due to initial 
killing only among higher similarity participants. Accordingly, among those with higher prior 
similarity ratings, one initial killing led to more subsequent self-paced killing than no initial 
killing, β = -.35, SE = 1.24, t = -2.17, p < .05. Among those with lower prior similarity 
ratings, however, initial killing did not affect subsequent self-paced killing, β = .17, SE = 
1.24, t = 1.04, p = .30. These results are consistent with the idea that more prior perceived 
similarity makes an initial kill particularly threatening, leading to increases in killing that may 
help justify the initial behavior.   
Ancillary analyses 
Choice. We set up the timed 20-second killing task so that we could measure self-
paced and relatively voluntary killing. As a check on the degree to which participants 
perceived more choice during the self-paced task, we compared the choice ratings for the 20-
second task to the choice ratings for the initial killing task for those participants in the initial 
killing condition. A 2-way (choice: initial killing vs. 20-second killing) repeated measures 
ANOVA showed that, as predicted, participants perceived the number of bugs they killed 
during the 20-second task as more a function of their own choice (M = 7.06, SD = 2.21) than 
their killing during the initial practice task (M = 4.76, SD = 2.95), F (1,32) = 13.43, p < .01. 
This analysis suggests that the degree of killing during the 20-second task was conducted in a 
relatively self-initiated or self-paced manner, as compared to the initial killing. Further, the 
20-second task choice ratings were on average well above the midline of the 9-point scale, 
further suggesting that this task allowed us to measure the degree of self-paced killing. 
 Affect. To examine the effect of our independent variables on affect we computed an 
overall basic affect score for each participant from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) 
presented just after the self-paced killing task. To do so, we subtracted the basic negative 
affect subscale from the basic positive affect subscale. Larger numbers, therefore, reflect 
more positive mood. We regressed these overall basic affect scores onto initial killing, prior 
similarity, and their interaction. Only an effect for initial killing emerged, β = -.30, SE = .24, t 
= -2.61, p < .05. People who killed one bug initially expressed more negative affect 
afterwards (M = .09, SD = 1.03) than those who did not kill initially (M = .70, SD = .92), 
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perhaps because engaging in two killing tasks engenders more negative affect. We found no 
relationship between prior perceived similarity and affect, p > .80, but such a relationship 
would only be expected to emerge directly after the initial killing. Once higher similarity 
participants have engaged in the self-paced killing, they have presumably behaved in such a 
way as to minimize or defend against the threat. 
Study 2 
In Study 1 we found that with no initial killing, participants who perceived themselves 
as more similar to bugs killed fewer bugs during the self-paced 20-second extermination task. 
This supported our prediction that perceived similarity to targets would imbue the act of 
killing with increased potential for threat, leading to a greater reluctance to kill. In contrast, 
higher similarity participants who performed an initial kill were more likely to subsequently 
kill during the self-paced task than were higher similarity participants who did not kill 
initially. This finding supported our prediction that perceived similarity can fuel defensive 
responses to initial killing.  
In this initial experiment, however, we did not observe a reversal of the relationship 
between perceived similarity and killing after an initial kill. That is, among those participants 
who made an initial kill, greater perceived similarity did not significantly predict greater 
killing—a result that would support the strong form our central hypothesis. We suspected that 
engaging in one initial kill might have increased the defensive function of subsequent killing 
enough to reduce the inhibitory effect of similarity on killing but not enough to reverse the 
relationship. By this logic, further increasing the quantity of bugs killed in an initial task 
might increase the defensive function served by the self-paced killing among those for whom 
killing bugs is threatening. In other words, to the extent that similarity makes killing 
threatening, with increased initial killing, greater similarity should come to predict even 
greater subsequent self-paced killing. Consequently, in Study 2 we upped the degree of initial 
killing to five bugs in order to examine whether this increased initial killing would lead 
higher similarity participants to kill significantly more during the self-paced task than those 
who kill only one bug initially.    
Method 
Participants and design   
Fifty-eight introductory psychology students at the University of Arizona participated 
to partially fulfill a course requirement. One participant discontinued the study after reading 
the consent form. One participant was excluded from analyses because he did not follow 
directions. Three participants were excluded because they expressed severe suspicion that 
they were not killing the bugs. This left 53 participants (20 male, 33 female). 
Materials and procedure   
The materials and procedure were identical to those of Study 1, with the following 
exceptions. The quantity of bugs initially killed was again manipulated during the 
introduction to the materials and procedure, but participants were randomly assigned either to 
initially dump a single pill bug into the grinder or to dump five pill bugs, one at a time, into 
the grinder. Additionally, the experimenter’s instructions for the 20-second extermination 
task differed slightly from Study 1. In Study 2 the experimenter instructed participants simply 
to “put bugs in to the grinder for the 20-second period,” and so omitted the instruction to 
perform the task “continuously.” This was omitted to provide more freedom to participants 
during the self-paced killing. As in Study 1, the index of post-study similarity to pill bugs (M 
= 2.98, SD = 1.86) was significantly related to our pre-test measure of similarity (M = 2.64, 
SD = 1.47), r = .33, p < .05. 
Results and Discussion 
Self-paced killing 
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 To test our hypothesis that higher similarity participants will exhibit an increase in 
self-paced killing as a function of greater initial killing, we regressed the number of bugs 
killed during the 20-second task onto initial killing (1 vs. 5; dummy coded), the continuous 
measure of prior perceived similarity to bugs (mean centered), and their interaction. A main 
effect for initial killing emerged, β = .32, SE = .96, t = 2.54, p < .05. Participants led to kill 
five bugs initially went on to kill more bugs during the self-paced 20-second task (M = 8.42, 
SD = 3.94) than participants led to kill only one bug initially (M = 6.00, SD = 3.36). 
Qualifying this effect was the predicted initial killing by prior similarity interaction, β 
= .26, SE = .66, t = 2.04, p < .05. As in Study 1, we plotted this interaction (Figure 3) using 
one standard deviation above and below the mean of similarity. Analyses of the simple slopes 
indicated that, just as in Study 1, among participants led to kill one bug initially, there was no 
relationship between prior similarity and the number of bugs killed during the 20-second task, 
β = -.03, SE = .44, t = -.15, p > .85. However, among those participants led to kill five bugs 
initially, the higher their prior similarity ratings, the more they killed during the 20-second 
task, β = .50, SE = .49, t = 2.60, p < .05. Thus, the inhibitory effect of prior similarity on self-
paced killing observed when no initial kill took place (see Study 1) was completely reversed 
when participants were induced to kill five bugs initially.  
We also examined this interaction by testing the effects of initial killing for those 
higher and lower in prior perceived similarity to bugs. Among those with higher prior 
similarity ratings, killing five bugs initially led to more subsequent self-paced killing than 
killing one initially, β = .58, SE = 1.37, t = 3.24, p < .01. Among those with low prior 
similarity ratings, initial killing did not affect subsequent self-paced killing, β = .06, SE = 
1.36, t = .34, p = .74.  
These results confirm our hypothesis that, among those participants higher in prior 
perceived similarity, increasing the amount of initial killing (beyond that in Study 1) 
promotes even more subsequent self-paced killing. In conjunction with Study 1, these 
findings suggest that, among higher similarity participants, increasing initial killing fuels 
subsequent killing in an effort to defend against the threat posed by the initial killing. 
Ancillary Analyses 
Choice. As in Study 1, we compared the 20-second choice ratings and the initial 
killing choice ratings. A 2-way (choice: initial vs. 20-second) repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that participants perceived the number of bugs they killed during the 20-second task 
as more their own choice (M = 7.53, SD = 1.75) relative to their killing during the initial 
practice task (M = 4.77, SD = 3.05), F (1, 52) = 36.20, p < .01.  
 Affect. As in Study 1, from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) presented just 
after the self-paced killing, we computed an overall basic affect score for each participant. 
We regressed these overall affect scores onto initial killing, prior perceived similarity, and 
their interaction. The interaction did not reach significance, p > .25, nor did the main effects, 
ps > .10, suggesting that measuring affect after the self-paced killing alone might not allow us 
to assess the effect of self-paced killing on affect. To detect this defensive function of self-
paced killing, we would need to measure the change in affect from just before the self-paced 
killing to just after it. Therefore, in Study 3 we assessed affect both just before and just after 
the self-paced killing in order to examine whether more self-paced killing improves affect 
only in those people who kill five bugs initially.  
Study 3 
In Studies 1 and 2, we hypothesized and found that greater initial killing fuels 
subsequent self-paced killing among higher prior similarity participants. This supported the 
idea that elevated rates of killing in part reflect a defense employed when killing poses a 
threat to the killer. Additionally, to the extent that such a threat is present, defending against 
it may have beneficial affective consequences. In Study 3, we therefore tested the degree to 
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which engaging in such killing while under high threat (i.e., higher similarity), would have 
affective benefits for the perpetrator. In other words, if the higher levels of killing observed in 
Studies 1 and 2 reflect an effort to justify the initial killing of a similar target, then the more 
individuals in a high initial killing condition engage in self-paced killing, the less may be the 
emotional costs of their killing. 
To test this hypothesis in Study 3, we recruited people with some perceived similarity 
to bugs and assessed affect both just before and just after the self-paced killing task. We 
predicted that among those who killed five bugs initially, more self-paced killing would have 
affective benefits. In other words, if with more initial killing (five bugs), subsequent killing 
functions increasingly as a defense against the threat of killing, then the more people choose 
to kill during the self-paced task, the less negative affect they should experience. If 
subsequent killing serves as less of a justificatory defense for those who kill only one bug 
initially, then subsequent killing should not yield emotional benefits.  
Participants 
In Studies 1 and 2 we found no effects on voluntary killing among participants low in 
prior perceived similarity to bugs. This is consistent with our reasoning that killing bugs 
should generally pose little threat to these participants, and therefore should not lead to 
defense in the form of increased self-paced killing. Thus, in Study 3, we recruited only 
participants who expressed some degree of similarity—who rated their similarity to insects 
above one (roughly two-thirds of participants in Studies 1 and 2).  
Thirty-two introductory psychology students at the University of Arizona participated 
to partially fulfill a course requirement. One participant was excluded from the analyses 
because she did not follow directions. Three participants were excluded because they 
expressed strong suspicion that they were not killing the bugs. This left 28 participants (9 
male, 19 female). 
Procedure 
The materials and procedure were identical to those of Study 2, with the following 
exception. After the practice task in which we manipulated initial killing (one bug or five 
bugs), the experimenter led participants back to their original cubicles. He told participants 
that people enter the study in different moods and that to control for this, we ask participants 
to fill out measures that assess mood. He then provided participants with the PANAS-X to 
complete. This served as our baseline for affect. Once finished, the experimenter ushered the 
participants back into the extermination cubicle to complete the 20-second extermination 
task. Just after this task, upon returning to their original cubicles, participants again filled out 
the PANAS-X followed by the same questions presented in the prior studies pertaining to 
perceived choice and similarity. 
Results and Discussion 
Affect 
The manipulation of initial killing did not influence overall affect at time 1, nor did it 
influence negative or positive affect separately at time 1, all ps > .20. However, we did find 
the predicted relationship between prior perceived similarity ratings and overall affect at time 
1. When we eliminated one participant with an extreme score on the prior similarity 
measure—who exceeded the mean by more than 2.5 standard deviations (Kirk, 1995)—we 
found that greater prior similarity (M = 4.04, SD = 1.88) predicted more negative affect just 
after the initial killing task, r = -.38, p < .05. This suggests that prior similarity promoted 
threat as a consequence of the initial killing.  
Self-paced killing 
We examined whether killing five bugs initially would lead to more subsequent self-
paced killing. We entered the number of bugs killed during the 20-second task into an (initial 
killing: 1 vs. 5) ANOVA and, replicating Study 2, we found that killing five bugs initially led 
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to more subsequent self-paced killing (M = 10.23, SD = 2.32) than killing one bug initially 
(M = 5.47, SD = 3.42), F (1, 26) = 18.02, p < .01 (see Figure 4).  
Effect of self-paced killing on affect 
To examine our hypothesis that more self-paced killing would serve as a defense 
against worsened affect among those who killed five bugs initially but not among those who 
killed only one bug initially, we computed overall affect scores from the PANAS-X (Watson 
& Clark, 1994) both at time 1 and time 2. Then we computed an affect change score for each 
participant by subtracting overall affect at time 1 from overall affect at time 2. Thus, larger 
and positive numbers reflect improved affect; smaller and negative numbers reflected 
worsened affect.  
Next we computed within-cell correlations between self-paced killing and change in 
affect. The correlation between these variables was significant among those who killed five 
bugs initially, r = .66, p < .05—more killing during the 20-second period led to more 
favorable affective change, while less killing worsened affect. However, among participants 
who killed only one bug initially, this correlation was not significant and tended to be 
negative, r = -.35, p = .21. These two within cell correlations differed significantly, z = 2.70, 
p < .01. Thus these data supported our hypothesis that higher initial killing motivates 
subsequent killing, and are consistent with the idea that this effect emerges because 
subsequent killing functions to defend against threat-related emotion triggered by the initial 
killing.  
We also examined within cell correlations between self-paced killing and positive and 
negative affective change scores separately (displayed in Table 1).4 First, more killing during 
the self-paced task predicted increased positive affect among those who killed five bugs 
initially, r = .67, p < .05, but not among those who killed one bug initially, r = -.43, p = .11. 
These two correlations differed significantly, z = 2.97, p < .01. Second, more killing 
predicted decreased negative affect in those who killed five bugs initially, r = -.55, p = .05, 
but not in those who killed one bug initially, r = .05, p = .86, although these correlations did 
not differ significantly, z = 1.41, p = .16. However, when we further examined the negative 
affect component subscales (fear, hostility, guilt, and sadness), we found the predicted pattern 
of relationships for guilt. More killing predicted decreased guilt in those who killed five bugs 
initially, r = -.59, p < .05, but not in those who killed one bug initially, r = .27, p = .33, and 
these correlations differed significantly, z = 2.23, p < .05. For none of the other subscales did 
change in affect predict killing in either condition, ps > .15. In sum, we found evidence that 
the amount of self-paced killing predicted both positive and negative affective change, 
though negative affective change seemed to be specific to guilt. 
General Discussion 
 The present studies tested and found support for the hypothesis that directing people 
to kill more bugs initially leads them to kill more during a subsequent self-paced task. 
Further, the results supported the prediction that such increased self-paced killing emerges 
when the initial killing generates psychological threat in the perpetrator due to the 
perpetrator’s perceived similarity to the target. Studies 1 and 2 showed that increased self-
paced killing due to more initial killing only emerged among people who perceived 
themselves as similar to bugs. In Study 1, without any initial killing, more prior perceived 
similarity to bugs predicted the killing of fewer bugs in the self-paced extermination task; but 
this relationship was eliminated when participants were initially led to kill one bug. Study 2 
demonstrated that elevating the number of bugs initially killed to five caused participants 
higher in perceived similarity to bugs to kill more than those who did not perceive themselves 
as similar. Study 3 examined the affective consequences of self-paced killing among 
participants higher in perceived similarity. This study showed that, among participants who 
killed only one bug initially, the amount of subsequent self-paced killing did not significantly 
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influence change in affect. However, with more initial killing (five bugs), the more bugs 
participants killed during the self-paced task, the less negative affect and more positive affect 
they reported. Thus, killing more in the self-paced task appeared to provide an affective 
benefit.   
The results of Study 3 pertained to change in affect from time 1 to time 2; participants 
did not express more negative emotion at time 1 after killing five bugs than after killing one. 
It is therefore not entirely clear that an affective manifestation of threat from killing five bugs 
(as opposed to one) provoked the higher rate of self-paced killing observed in Study 3. One 
possible reason that no difference in negative affect as a function of amount initially killed 
was observed could be that, immediately after the initial killing task, participants instantly 
began rationalizing or justifying their behavior, helping to partly reduce affective 
manifestations of threat.   
In a supplementary study, we therefore investigated the potential for increased threat 
in a manner that would reduce the impact of immediate defensiveness on responses. 
Specifically, 77 students from the same participant pool drawn from in all three studies read a 
description of the basic procedure, which varied only in whether the person would be 
instructed to kill one or five bugs. We then asked these participants to indicate how they 
thought others confronted with the procedure would feel in terms of reluctance, perceived 
ethicality, discomfort, upset, tenseness, and guilt on nine-point scales. A composite measure 
of perceived threat yielded an alpha of .90. Consistent with the idea that killing five bugs 
arouses more threat than killing one, participants who read that the task involved killing five 
bugs thought others would experience more threat-related feelings (M = 4.39, SD = 1.73) than 
did participants who read that the task involved killing one bug (M = 3.53, SD = 1.95), F (1, 
75) = 4.16, p < .05.   
The procedures employed in this supplementary study were hypothetical, which 
introduces both a limitation and a strength. The limitation is that the results reflect 
participants’ expectations about level of threat rather than what actually occurs if one does 
the killing. Undoubtedly, with respect to perpetrating violence, people have difficulties 
knowing or predicting how they or others will respond (e.g., Milgram, 1974). The strength is 
that, because it was hypothetical and not self-relevant, this study enabled us to examine the 
anticipated impact of killing one versus five bugs in the absence of any motivation to defend 
against the threat of actually doing the killing. Further, it may be that what is most important 
here is how people think they will react, or how people would expect to feel. In other words, 
it may be that the threat in this particular situation has to do with the potential for 
experiencing negative affect. This supplemental finding thus provides some evidence that 
killing five bugs is likely to engender more threat than killing one bug, supporting the idea 
that the higher self-paced killing observed in Studies 1 through 3 stemmed from defensive 
efforts to reduce potential negative affective consequences of greater initial killing. 
Although the findings from the present studies support our core hypotheses, future 
research should more specifically examine the affective and mediating processes involved in 
these effects. The self-report affect measure in Study 3 seemed sensitive to detecting affective 
change, but did not detect absolute differences between more and less initial killing. One 
might even wonder whether killing five bugs is less threatening or traumatic than killing one 
(see, for example, recent evidence that learning of multiple people suffering may arouse less 
empathy than learning of only one person suffering; Slovic, 2007). And indeed, more self-
paced killing reduced negative affect in Study 3. But it may be too that increasing killing has 
a paradoxical effect; that as it eases negative affect, it at the same time digs one into an even 
deeper hole. If increased killing defends against trauma, it seems at the same time to increase 
the magnitude of the unethical act if acknowledged, thereby increasing threat in the form of 
the potential for negative affect. To better understand these processes, it may be useful to 
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examine the mediational impact other forms of affect (e.g., disgust, shame) and the potential 
for experiencing them (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003), and to employ more subtle indicators of 
affect, such as implicit cognitive (e.g., lexical decision task using affect-relevant words) or 
physiological (e.g., facial EMG) measures, which are less vulnerable to defensive responding.   
Killing begets killing: Possible alternative explanations 
 Possible alternative explanations exist for the basic finding that greater initial killing 
predicts greater subsequent killing. For example, killing may beget killing because greater 
initial killing simply primes people to kill more later (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). People 
may associate the task with more or less killing based on their initial “practice” experience 
with the extermination procedure. This association may then steer them towards more or less 
killing in similar future tasks. But this perspective cannot account for the interactions in the 
present studies between perceived similarity and initial killing. Specifically, the findings that 
increased killing was observed only among participants who perceived higher similarity to 
the bugs suggest that psychological threat rather than mere cognitive association was 
responsible for the increased self-paced killing. Further, increased self-paced killing after 
more initial killing served to improve mood, again consistent with the notion that the 
psychological function of the greater killing observed constitutes more than an automatic 
priming outcome.  
 Another possible alternative explanation for the effect of initial killing on subsequent 
killing is that more initial killing desensitized people, breaking down the psychological 
barriers that otherwise inhibit killing behavior (e.g., Bandura, 1973; Grossman & Siddle, 
2000). This hypothesis would predict that individuals who perceive higher prior similarity 
should be most affected by increased initial killing—similarity seems normally to produce a 
barrier against or inhibition against killing, as we observed in Study 1 under conditions of no 
initial killing. It therefore follows that desensitization should minimize or eliminate this 
inhibitory effect. Indeed, in Study 1 we find exactly this pattern. With one initial kill, higher 
similarity participants kill as much as low similar participants, who to begin with should be 
freer from the psychological barrier to killing. But Study 2 suggests that with even more 
initial killing—five bugs—higher similarity leads participants to willfully kill even more than 
those low in perceived similarity. Thus, the desensitization hypothesis does not explain this 
apparent motivational property of similarity—that after having increased initial killing to five 
bugs, higher similarity predicts killing at a pace that exceeds that of low similarity. 
Limitations and strengths of this paradigm 
These studies were conducted to address the conditions under which individuals may 
voluntarily increase killing behavior, and we hope that the present findings will contribute to 
future discourse and research on this topic. However, it is critical to emphasize that the 
present studies examined the killing of bugs, targets that of course differ from humans 
(although victims of genocide are often referred to by perpetrators as vermin or cockroaches). 
And the mode of killing in this paradigm is very different from the way both bugs and 
humans are killed in most contexts. Thus, we encourage great care in interpreting the 
potential application of the current findings to conflict involving killing of humans.  
Keeping such concerns in mind, the present results do appear consistent with 
observations from real-world conflict and killing as well as research pertinent to these issues 
(e.g., Browning, 1992; Browning, 2004; Charny, 2002; Staub, 2002; Kressel, 1996; Gross, 
2006). For example, Becker (1973) noted that the Nazi SS coerced recruits to commit 
increasingly severe atrocities to increase their subsequent willingness to commit further 
atrocities, a phenomenon referred to as Blutkitt (blood cement). As a more recent egregious 
example, the former Liberian leader, Charles Taylor, forced boys to kill their parents in order 
to recruit them into his militias bent on continued slaughter and upending the established 
older generations in power (Polgreen, 2006). 
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Moreover, because humans are at many levels perceivably more similar to one 
another than they are to bugs, the tendency for similarity to feed the threat of killing and 
defensive responses to such threat may be even greater in the context of inter-group conflicts, 
especially since such conflicts often involve groups that share physical and cultural 
similarities. If the threat of killing bugs triggers justificatory defense mechanisms driving 
additional killing of bugs, then it may be anticipated that killing other humans may elicit even 
more intensified defensiveness and killing. That is, most people would have greater difficulty 
killing a human than killing a bug, suggesting that justificatory efforts to cope with an initial 
kill of another human being may give rise to much more powerful urges than those elicited in 
the present studies. And indeed, real world killing can reach startling and almost 
inconceivable levels. Gourevitch (1998, p.133), for example, breaks down the numbers from 
the Rwandan genocide: “Take the best estimate: eight hundred thousand killed in a hundred 
days. That’s three hundred and thirty-three and a third murders an hour—or five and a half 
lives terminated every minute.” 
We should note, however, that our model for how killing perpetuates itself may also 
be applicable for non-killing instances of harming others. When any form of harm is 
performed severely and often enough, we would expect people to justify their behavior with 
continued aggression. What may differ, though, between these instances and those involving 
killing, is how quickly people reach a point of no return—a point at which one cannot back 
down and admit one’s wrongdoing. Because killing another living being is so completely 
irrevocable and severe, we suspect that it more readily lends itself to justification through 
further violence than lesser forms of harm-doing in which other paths toward psychological 
repair are more feasible. Now that we have developed a paradigm for studying killing, 
specifying the characteristics that distinguish killing from other forms of aggression, as well 
as identifying similarities in these processes, is an important challenge for future theoretical 
and empirical work. 
Though we here examine killing bugs in order to make inferences about killing 
humans, laboratory research generally makes inferences about killing from research that has 
little to do with killing. What this work offers, then, is a new methodological approach that 
should add to the existing literature on killing and conflict. It opens the door to experimental 
investigations into killing, and moreover, into mass killing. One hope, then, is that the present 
experimental investigations and future extensions will provide contributions that can, 
together with other forms of study (i.e., observation, interviewing, theorizing, introspecting, 
historical analysis, etc.), converge toward a more complete understanding of the 
psychological processes involved. 
Conclusion: Implications for reducing the promulgating effect of killing on subsequent killing 
The current findings suggest the unappealing possibility that initial killing among 
humans may effect quite dramatic increments in killing—an idea with potentially important 
implications for a functional role of early intervention in violent conflict. For instance, such 
insight may be of great value to agencies that monitor the precursors and emergence of 
deadly conflict, such as genocide watch agencies. Knowing the social and psychological 
conditions under which small acts of violence and killing are likely to perpetuate themselves 
may facilitate the development of preemptive interventions intended to avoid the ballooning 
of a few violent acts into mass killing and protracted carnage. Moreover, the present findings 
suggest a more detailed attending to perceived similarities among antagonistic groups—that 
contrary to what may seem intuitive, a greater sense of connection between groups may 
increase the risk for conflict spiraling out of control.   
Additionally, the present work may have implications for tactics in dealing with 
individual contributors to killing. If the mechanism proposed here is correct—that the threat 
elicited by initial killing contributes to subsequent driven killing—then perhaps this threat 
Killing begets killing 15 
can be alleviated or redirected for constructive rather destructive purposes. For example, it 
may be that bringing threat-related emotions into awareness—and with these emotions, 
awareness of one’s wrongdoing—allows for alternative and constructive ways to defend 
against or expiate these emotions (e.g., Freud, 1966; Pyszczynski et al., 1993; Pennebaker, 
1997). Some research suggests that focusing people on their negative emotions can stem 
increases in hostility otherwise fueled by these very emotions (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990; 
Finman & Berkowitz, 1989). Perhaps this kind of awareness can transform destructive and 
avoidant-type emotional experiences, such as those embodied by shame, into more 
reparative-type emotional experience, such as guilt (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A real world 
application of these kinds of ideas might be found in South Africa, where the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission allows those who were perpetrators of injustice under Apartheid 
a chance to gain amnesty if they come forward and disclose their knowledge of and 
involvement in atrocities. 
Finally, it is worth considering the potential effects of disseminating these kinds of 
psychological and behavioral research findings to the leaders and soldiers living in nations 
that are particularly vulnerable to violent conflict. Perhaps if potential perpetrators and their 
leaders better understood the effects of killing on the psyche and on subsequent tendencies 
toward killing, they would consider other options with due deliberation before charging down 
the blood-soaked path of escalating violence. If the evidence is clear that people are most able 
to resist coercion to kill before they have begun or in those very initial stages—that after this 
point changing the course becomes more and more psychologically intolerable—then perhaps 
this knowledge can help bolster people’s courage to resist in these precarious and critical 
early moments. With estimates showing over two-hundred million people dead from conflict 
and atrocities in this past century alone (Leitenberg, 2003), we hope this work will contribute 
to efforts that address these difficult problems and that expand the ways we think about and 
deal with these unthinkably destructive phenomena.  
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NOTES 
1. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the relevance of civil wars to our 
hypothesis. 
2. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 read a description emphasizing similarities or differences 
between the pill bugs and humans. This manipulation did not work; it had no effects on 
the dependent measures and failed to predict our manipulation check pertaining to 
similarity, ps > .10, whereas our pre-measure ratings of similarity did predict the 
manipulation check , r = .38, p < .001. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we excluded this 
variable from final analyses and do not discuss it further. 
3. In some other existing experimental paradigms, men on the whole tend to aggress more 
than women; however, these effects do not emerge consistently (Geen, 1998). In the 
studies presented here, we consistently found trends for men to kill more, but they never 
approached significance, and gender did not interact with initial killing and prior 
similarity, all ps > .40. Therefore, gender was not included in the analyses. 
4. We additionally examined the interaction between initial killing and similarity on affect 
change in regression analyses. The interaction effect with overall affective change was 
significant, p < .05; the interaction with positive affective change was significant, p < .05; 
the interaction with change in guilt was marginally significant, p = .07; the interaction 
with negative affect as DV was not significant, p = .16. 
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Table 1. Study 3: Correlations between self-paced killing and affective change as a function 
of initial killing.  
 
 Change in 
overall affect 
Change in 
positive affect 
Change in 
negative affect 
Change in 
guilt 
Initial killing 
Condition 
    
1 bug           -.35           -.43           +.05           +.27 
5 bugs          +.66*          +.67*            -.55*            -.59* 
NOTE: * p < .05 
 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The extermination cubicle with the bug-killing machine and one pill bug in its 
plastic cup. 
 
Figure 2. Study 1: Self-paced killing (bugs killed during the 20-second extermination task) as 
a function of initial killing and prior perceived similarity. 
 
Figure 3. Study 2: Self-paced killing (bugs killed during the 20-second extermination task) as 
a function of initial killing and prior perceived similarity. 
 
Figure 4. Study 3: Self-paced killing (bugs killed during the 20-second extermination task) as 
a function of initial killing. 
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Figure 4. 
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